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AN EXAMINATION OF THE NEED FOR CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM THROUGH THE LENS OF THE
UNITED STATES TREATY CLAUSE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION TREATIES
JORDAN SMITH*
INTRODUCTION
The United States’ federal election system is constantly the focus
of debate, including components from voting mechanisms, to candidate
selection, and to the candidates themselves. Unsurprisingly, campaign
finance has also been the source of much debate. For decades, scholars,
politicians, lawyers, and laypersons have debated the merits and short-
comings of the campaign finance system1 enumerated in the United States
Code.2 The landmark Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission3
(“FEC”) decision in 2010, in which the United States Supreme Court
equated corporate speech to human speech, merely added fuel to the fire.4
The considerable volume of scholarship based upon campaign finance re-
form covers a wealth of topics, but one stone has been left unturned: the
impact of unfettered campaign expenditures on the development of multi-
lateral international treaties.
It may be quite difficult for one to imagine a scenario in which
campaign finance could impede the adoption of a treaty under American
law. However, consider the Paris Climate Accord (“PCA”).5 The PCA was
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2019; BA Political Science, University of
Charleston, 2015. I would like to thank my family and friends for their constant encourage-
ment and support. I would also like to thank the staff of the William & Mary Environmental
Law and Policy Review, without whom this Note would not have been possible.
1 See, e.g., Tara Malloy & Bradley A. Smith, A Debate on Campaign Finance Disclosure,
38 VT. L. REV. 933, 933–35 (2014) (discussing the expansion of campaign finance debates).
2 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30146 (2017).
3 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
4 See generally Trevor Potter & Bryson B. Morgan, The History of Undisclosed Spending in
U.S. Elections & How 2012 Became the “Dark Money” Election, NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL’Y 383 (2013) (detailing the history of the law related to election disclosures).
5 Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 13, 2015, in Rep. of the Conference of the Parties of the Twenty-First Session, U.N.
Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, at 20–31 (2016).
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developed in 2015 as a result of large-scale international consensus
regarding the global need to reduce carbon emissions.6 The United States
became a party to the PCA via an executive order signed by then-President
Barack Obama.7 Debate soon arose as to whether the United States was
bound to adhere to the provisions of the PCA, however, as the PCA was
not adopted under the Treaty Clause of the United States Constitution.8
The Treaty Clause, in essence, provides that in order for the President to
enter into a treaty, he must do so with the approval of two-thirds of the
United States Senate.9 Under the executive order process, this approval
did not happen; yet, the United States continued to adhere to the PCA’s
provisions until early 2017, when the Trump Administration announced
that it planned to withdraw the United States from the PCA.10 Note that
as of this writing, the United States is still a party to the PCA.11
The PCA reinvigorates an intriguing, oft-debated question: Is the
Treaty Clause dormant? In the last century, the United States govern-
ment has made considerably little use of the Treaty Clause, despite the
increasingly international modern world.12 In many instances in which
the Treaty Clause does arise (in fact, in the only instance in which many
American law students study the Treaty Clause), the focus is upon
environmental treaties. For example, Missouri v. Holland,13 the seminal
constitutional law case on the subject, centered upon the enforcement of
a wildlife protection treaty,14 the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.15 So one
must wonder why international agreements like the PCA have bypassed
6 Id. at 2.
7 Joel Stonedale, President Obama’s signing of the Paris Agreement is only good for nine
months, THE HILL (Apr. 18, 2016, 12:11PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy
-environment/276668-president-obamas-signing-of-the-paris-agreement-is [https://perma
.cc/FA2H-BHXV]; Statement by the President on the Paris Climate Agreement, WHITE
HOUSE (Dec. 12, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/12
/12/statement-president-paris-climate-agreement [https://perma.cc/TX4D-BDQS].
8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
9 Id.
10 Eugene Kontorovich, The U.S. can’t quit the Paris climate agreement, because it never
actually joined, WASHINGTON POST (June 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/01/the-u-s-cant-quit-the-paris-climate-agreement-because
-it-never-actually-joined/?utm_term=.b9f096b26f84 [https://perma.cc/BHC6-4Z2T].
11 United Nations Treaty Collection: Status of Treaties, UNITED NATIONS, https://treaties
.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=27&subid=A&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/TC5Q-R24G].
12 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, TREATIES PENDING IN THE SENATE
(July 26, 2018), https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/pending/ [https://perma.cc/EX34-4X9E].
13 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
14 Id.
15 Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2000).
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the Treaty Clause in their adoption into United States law. There are a
number of potential explanations for this, but this Note posits that one
reason is the increasing difficulty individuals and environmental interest
groups have in influencing politicians; this is a direct result of excessive
corporate influence in campaign finance expenditures.
In the following discussion, I suggest that the Treaty Clause of
the United States Constitution will lie dormant unless the American
campaign finance system is reformed to regulate corporate influence.
Major oil, gas, and energy companies will continue to utilize massive soft
money expenditures to overshadow the political voices of environmental
interest groups and individuals; as a result, no multinational environ-
mental regulatory treaty will likely surpass the two-thirds majority
senatorial threshold required to bring a treaty into full force in American
law. To facilitate this discussion, I have broken this Note into four sections:
(1) an overview of the Treaty Clause and its decline, (2) the basics of cam-
paign finance law, (3) an empirical analysis of campaign contributions by
the oil and gas industry and the voting patterns of a cross-section of United
States Senators, and (4) a discussion connecting that data to the question
of Treaty Clause dormancy. Along the way, I will also discuss possible legal
rationales for reforming the campaign finance system and the future
with or without such reform.
I. THE TREATY POWER
As the underlying current of this Note is the Treaty Clause of the
United States Constitution, it is important to begin this discussion with a
short overview of its legal history, interpretation, and language. The Treaty
Clause, embodied at Article II, § 2, clause 2 of the United States Constitu-
tion, states “[The President] shall have power, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators
present concur.”16 On its face, it is simple to denote the particular elements
of this clause: (1) the President is afforded power to make treaties; (2)
two-thirds of the U.S. Senate must consent to any treaty before said treaty
can become binding upon the United States. As will be discussed later in
this Note, in the modern age of consistent party-line votes, and where no
party holds a two-thirds majority of the Senate, it comes as no surprise
that methods of skirting the requirements of this Clause have arisen.17
16 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
17 Note, Restructuring the Modern Treaty Power, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2478, 2494–95 (2001)
(referring to the shift to congressional-executive agreements).
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However, for the time being, this discussion will turn to early uses of the
Treaty Clause.
As many first-year law students across the United States will attest,
Missouri v. Holland18 is the seminal case in Treaty Clause jurisprudence;
fitting to this discussion, Holland’s focus is upon what is essentially an
environmental treaty: the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (“MBTA”).19 The
MBTA sought to prevent the capture and slaughter of a variety of migra-
tory birds which were essential in ensuring the health of subsistence
crops in North America.20 Congress previously attempted to regulate the
capture and killing of these migratory birds under the Commerce Clause,21
but federal district courts in Arkansas and Kansas held the law invalid
as an infringement upon state sovereignty.22 In Holland, however, the
Supreme Court confirmed that, though Congress could not pass the MBTA
pursuant to domestic law, the President and the Senate could bind the
United States to the MBTA under the Treaty Clause.23 Not only does the
Holland decision confirm that the United States was empowered to
enforce treaties upon the several states; the Court also closes with
language that is particularly powerful in the environmental context:
Here a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude
is involved. It can be protected only by national action in
concert with that of another power. The subject-matter is
only transitorily within the State and has no permanent
habitat therein. But for the treaty and the statute there
soon might be no birds for any powers to deal with. We see
nothing in the Constitution that compels the Government
to sit by while a food supply is cut off and the protectors of
our forests and crops are destroyed. It is not sufficient to
rely upon the States. The reliance is vain . . . .24
Perhaps inadvertently, yet fortuitously, the Holland court set forth
a line of reasoning that is almost universally applicable to environmental
treaties, particularly in the realm of climate regulation. A treaty may be
18 Holland, 252 U.S. at 416.
19 Id. at 431.
20 See generally Migratory Bird Treaty Act, supra note 15.
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
22 See United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914); United States v. McCullagh,
221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915).
23 Holland, 252 U.S. at 435.
24 Id.
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justified on the grounds that it concerns a national interest of great magni-
tude, and which can only be protected via “national action in concert with
that of another power [or powers].”25
The United States Supreme Court has continuously reaffirmed
Holland’s core principles.26 That said, in 2014, in Bond v. United States,27
Justice Scalia (concurring in judgment) authored a vigorous re-examination
of the Holland decision.28 Scalia noted that at the time of Holland’s de-
cision, the vast majority of treaties were bilateral, fairly nonpartisan,
and singularly focused, but that in the present day, treaties frequently in-
volve the agreement of multiple nations and touch upon every facet of
life.29 This, according to Justice Scalia, comes problematically close (“only
one treaty away”) to a general police power.30 Specifically, Justice Scalia
seemed concerned about the use of the Necessary and Proper Clause31 to
enact legislation disguised as furthering the directive of a treaty, but
which, in fact, is solely designed to infringe upon a state’s rights.32 In the
end, despite Justice Scalia’s criticism, the majority declined to reconsider
Holland, instead insisting that the case could be decided on non-constitu-
tional grounds.33
Justice Scalia’s concerns are indeed pertinent for this Note, and
will be revisited further below when discussing potential explanations for
the decline in the use of the Treaty Clause in the environmental treaty
context. For now, it is sufficient to acknowledge that the core of Missouri
v. Holland has withstood nearly a century, and thousands of citing cases,
of litigation. The principle holds strong, but we may be witnessing the
first rumbles that will shake Holland’s foundation.
II. THE BASICS OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE
Modern campaign finance law has its origins in Congress’s 1974
amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”), which insti-
tuted the first quantified limits on groups’ and individuals’ contributions
25 Id.
26 See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 429 U.S. 529 (1976); North Dakota v. United States 460
U.S. 300 (1983).
27 Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844 (2014).
28 Id. at 873–82.
29 Id. at 877.
30 Id. at 879.
31 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18.
32 Bond, 572 U.S. at 879.
33 Id. at 855.
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to candidates and their campaigns.34 In addition to contribution limits,
the 1974 amendments also imposed donor disclosure requirements and
limits on independent campaign expenditures.35
In the past forty years, a myriad of judicial decisions36 and Con-
gressional acts37 have chipped away at the original campaign finance
structure, and ultimately paved the way for substantial corporate influ-
ence in the campaign finance realm. Within months of the passage of the
1974 amendments, in Buckley v. Valeo, the United States Supreme Court
invalidated FECA’s restrictions on independent expenditures as burdens
on political expression protected under the First Amendment.38 The Court
reasoned that such independent expenditures could not give the impression
of corruption in the political sphere because the expenditures were not
attached to candidates or their campaigns.39 The Court did not invalidate
restrictions on contributions to specific candidates or campaigns.
Under current federal law, corporations are prohibited from
making political contributions directly from their treasuries; instead,
they must have segregated funds set aside specifically for political
activity.40 The following cases have challenged laws of similar construc-
tion in their application of the First Amendment’s protection of political
speech to corporations. In FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.
(“MCFL”),41 the Court again pulled back on the government’s anti-corrup-
tion interest concerning corporate expenditures.42 The Court held that
MCFL was not to be bound by the segregated fund requirement because,
despite being incorporated, MCFL more closely resembled a voluntary
political organization than a corporation.43 The Court reasoned this was
because: (1) MCFL was formed for the express purpose of promoting
political ideas, and could not engage in political activities; (2) MCFL had
no shareholders or persons claiming its assets; and (3) MCFL did not
accept contributions from corporations or labor unions.44
34 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263.
35 Id.
36 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976); Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Austin
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 652.
37 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, tit. I, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
38 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1.
39 Id. at 14–19.
40 52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(3)(2002).
41 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 478 U.S. 238 (1986).
42 Id. at 264.
43 Id. at 263–64.
44 Id.
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Next in this line of cases came Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce.45 There, the United States Supreme Court upheld a state law
requiring corporate political expenditures to be made from a segregated
political fund.46 The Court distinguished this case from MCFL on the
grounds that the Michigan Chamber of Commerce failed to meet any of
the factors that distinguished MCFL from a business corporation: the
Chamber of Commerce was designed as a business entity, it had several
shareholders, and it received contributions (almost exclusively) from
businesses and labor unions.47
McConnell v. FEC48 arose shortly after the passage of the Biparti-
san Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”), also known as the McCain-
Feingold Act, which further amended FECA.49 The BCRA brought a
number of changes to campaign finance law, including the regulation of soft
money contributions.50 The Court in McConnell upheld a number of limita-
tions on the use of soft money in federal elections, but struck down others.51
The final step in our historical overview is Citizens United v.
FEC.52 This case completely overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce and partially overruled McConnell v. FEC.53 In terms of the
Austin ruling, the Court in Citizens United held that the government is
unable to suppress political speech because the speaker has a corporate
identity.54 In so ruling, the Citizens United Court unequivocally held that
independent corporate expenditures could not result in the appearance of
political corruption and further found that the government’s asserted anti-
distortion interest was simply not compelling.55 In terms of McConnell,
the Court held that a federal statute (arising from BCRA) which barred
independent corporate expenditures for electioneering communications
was in violation of the First Amendment.56
Now that a very basic history is set forth, we will shift to the
discussion of the actual campaign finance topics that are the focus of this
45 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
46 Id. at 669.
47 Id. at 662–64.
48 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
49 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 107 P.L. 155, 116 Stat. 81.
50 Id.
51 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 223–24.
52 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
53 See generally id.
54 Id. at 342–43.
55 Id. at 347–48.
56 Id. at 366.
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Note. In the next few paragraphs, I hope to set out the basic statutory
guidelines for hard and soft money. Hard money can be covered exclu-
sively with a discussion of the United States Code, but soft money, at least
post–Citizens United, requires a more scholarly tactic. In that section, I
will examine the McConnell approach to soft money and discuss a few
academic works that have performed in-depth studies of the topic.
A. Hard Money
From its inception in the 1974 amendments to FECA into the
modern day, statutory campaign finance law has instituted limits on hard
money. Hard money includes any contributions and expenditures that can
be attributed to a particular candidate or campaign, and are thus subject
to limits imposed by federal law.57 Today, these limitations are codified
at 52 U.S.C. § 30116.58
In essence, individuals, groups, and corporations are prohibited
from making contributions to: (1) any candidate or the candidate’s
organized political committee in excess of $2,000 per year;59 (2) political
committees organized by a national political party in excess of $25,000
per year;60 (3) political committees organized by a state committee or a
political party in excess of $10,000 per year;61 or (4) any other political
committee in excess of $5,000 per year.62
Under this Code section, a contribution to a candidate or cam-
paign includes the following: (1) donations to a named candidate or
candidate’s authorized political committee;63 and (2) expenditures made
in “cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or sugges-
tion of, a candidate” or his or her authorized committee.64 The Code also
provides that individual financing of campaign broadcasts or materials
prepared by the candidate, his or her political committee, or authorized
agents will be considered a contribution if the broadcast or material
meets the criteria for “electioneering communications” and the funding
is coordinated with the candidate, his or her authorized committee, a
57 Jeffrey Milyo, The Political Economics of Campaign Finance, 3 INDEP. REV. 537, 539
(1999).
58 52 U.S.C. § 30116 (1975).
59 Id. § 30116(a)(1)(A).
60 Id. § 30116(a)(1)(B).
61 Id. § 30116(a)(1)(D).
62 Id. § 30116(a)(1)(C).
63 Id. § 30116(a)(7)(A).
64 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B)(i).
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federal, state, or local political party or committee, or an agent of any such
candidate, party, or committee.65 Electioneering communications include
any “broadcast, cable, or satellite communication[s] which [refer] to a
clearly identified candidate for Federal office” and which are made within
sixty days of a general election, or thirty days of a primary election.66
As these hard money contributions are so quantifiably limited by
federal law, they are not necessarily the focus of this Note; this is largely
because hard money contributions have a rather insubstantial impact
when compared to soft money contributions.
B. Soft Money
Soft money contributions and expenditures are those allocations
of money which are not subject to federal regulation, for example, issue-
advocacy campaigns.67 The McConnell court took precisely this approach
in its discussion of soft money; there, the Court stated that under FECA
requirements, hard money contributions were only “made with funds that
are subject to [FECA’s] disclosure requirements and source and amount
limitations” and only targeted federal elections.68 Soft money, on the other
hand, encompassed “[d]onations made solely for the purpose of influencing
state or local elections [and] are therefore unaffected by FECA’s require-
ments and prohibitions.”69 According to the McConnell Court, soft money
took on a life of its own and its permitted uses continued to expand; the
uses enumerated by the Court included mixed-purpose activities (get-out-
the-vote drives and generic party advertising) and legislative advocacy
advertisements (which could include the names of federal candidates so
long as they did not advocate for the defeat or support of said candidate).70
Even in the McConnell Court’s view, soft money contributions were
skyrocketing and often surpassing hard money contributions.71 Further,
the Court recognized that many soft money contributions, though in the
state and local sphere, were designed to gain access to candidates in the
federal realm, and were quite often solicited by candidates who directed
donors to contribute to “party committees and tax-exempt organizations
65 Id. § 30116(a)(7)(C).
66 Id. § 30101(f)(3)(A)(i).
67 Milyo, supra note 57, at 540.
68 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 122 (2003).
69 Id. at 122–23 (emphasis added).
70 Id. at 123–24.
71 Id. at 124.
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that could legally accept soft money.”72 Recall that the Court upheld a
number of BCRA regulations of soft money contributions in McConnell,
including a prohibition on national party committees and their agents
from soliciting, receiving, directing, or spending soft money, effectively
removing the federal candidates from the soft money game.73 The Court
justified this on the ground that the prohibition on the use of soft money
limits the source and amount of donations, but does not reach the level
of expenditure limitations.74
As we now know, however, the McConnell Court’s approach did not
last. As the years progressed, several challenges saw the gradual disman-
tling of the BCRA’s soft money limits. Two cases in particular, EMILY’s
List v. FEC75 and Citizens United v. FEC,76 brought about the insurgence
of unlimited, unregulated soft money contributions that are now com-
monplace in elections. EMILY’s List permitted nonprofit, unconnected
political committees to make unlimited independent expenditures funded
with soft money, so long as any direct contributions to candidates were
made with hard money.77 Citizens United extended this to corporations and
labor unions.78 Further, in overruling Austin and part of McConnell, the
Court in Citizens United effectively permitted unions and corporations
to expend unlimited amounts of soft money in express advocacy cam-
paigns, something which had been explicitly prohibited under BCRA.79
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND THE
VOTING PATTERNS OF SENATORS
Most of us are familiar with the notion that “money talks” when
it comes to persuading politicians. For decades, political scientists have
studied the interplay between politicians’ voting patterns and the amount
of lobbying and campaign contributions directed toward those politicians.80
72 Id. at 125.
73 Id. at 133.
74 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 139.
75 EMILY’s List v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 581 F.3d 1 (2009).
76 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
77 EMILY’s List, 581 F.3d at 12.
78 Citizens United, 588 U.S. at 399–401.
79 Id. at 365–66.
80 See Note, Restoring Electoral Equilibrium in the Wake of Constitutionalized Campaign
Finance, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1528 (2011). See generally Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, Soft
Money and Campaign Finance Reform, 54 INT’L ECON. REV. 1117 (2013); D.E. Apollonio
& Raymond J. La Raja, Who Gave Soft Money? The Effect of Interest Group Resources on
Political Contributions, 66 J. OF POL. 1134 (2004).
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This Note also analyzes this interplay, but not in the depth that many
political scientists have. This Part will examine the voting patterns of a
number of United States senators who have received campaign contribu-
tions from both Big Oil & Energy and environmental interest groups. In
addition, this Part will examine the shift, post–Citizens United, from direct
campaign contributions (hard money) to contributions to outside spend-
ing groups (soft money).
The following analysis is limited to senatorial votes and campaign
contributions between the years 2010 and 2016 (just prior to Citizens
United, through the most recently completed election cycle). Further, for
the purposes of this discussion, presidential candidates have been elimi-
nated from the analysis, as there are likely significant increases in dona-
tions to these candidates from all sectors solely for the purpose of the
presidential election. As a result, this examination will focus upon a group
of senators who consistently rank within the top twenty recipients of
campaign contributions from both Big Oil & Energy and environmental
interest groups.81
Finally, as the United States Senate has not approved any envi-
ronmental treaties in the time frame upon which this discussion focuses,
Senate roll call votes on environmentally focused legislation will be exam-
ined to infer the potential success or defeat of an environmental treaty
brought before the Senate. As of this writing, from the 112th Congress
through the 115th Congress, only a single piece of environmental legisla-
tion which is now public law resulted in a Senate roll-call vote: a joint
resolution to nullify the Stream Protection Rule promulgated by the
Department of the Interior.82 However, several roll call votes are avail-
able for amendments to pieces of environmental legislation, confirma-
tions, and reversals of presidential vetoes. For the purposes of this Note,
these voting records will be sufficient.
A. Senators
Between 2010 and 2016, Big Oil & Energy and environmental
groups consistently contributed to the campaigns of several senators.83 Two
Republican politicians have received contributions from both groups in
81 Environment: Top Recipients, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/re
cips.php?cycle=2016&ind=Q11 [https://perma.cc/EXE5-26PQ]; Oil & Gas: Top Recipients,
OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.php?ind=E01&recipdetail
=S&sortorder=U&mem=Y&cycle=2016 [https://perma.cc/8FEW-DCZU].
82 Vote Report—2017 Senate Roll No. 43: Hearing on H.J. Res. 38, 115th Cong. (Feb. 2, 2017).
83 See infra notes 84–87.
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at least two of the last four election cycles: David Vitter (Louisiana)84 and
Richard Burr (North Carolina).85 Two Democrats have also received con-
tributions from both groups in two of the last four election cycles: Michael
Bennet (Colorado)86 and Mark Begich (Alaska).87 Finally, one Independent
(and later Republican), Lisa Murkowski (Alaska), received contributions
from Big Oil & Energy and environmental groups in 2010, but only re-
ceived contributions from Big Oil & Energy in subsequent election cycles.88
B. Contributions
Beginning with Senator David Vitter, the senator received $475,550
from Big Oil & Energy contributors,89 and $13,700 from environmental
groups in the 2010 cycle.90 In the 2012 cycle, Vitter received $101,400 from
Big Oil & Energy,91 and $8,000 from environmental group contributors.92
84 Oil & Gas: Top Recipients 2010, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/industries
/recips.php?ind=E01&recipdetail=S&sortorder=U&mem=Y&cycle=2010 [https://perma
.cc/C4N9-CPEE] [hereinafter Oil & Gas Recipients 2010]; Oil & Gas: Top Recipients 2012,
OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.php?ind=E01&recipdetail
=S&sortorder=U&mem=Y&cycle=2012 [https://perma.cc/5EUQ-42EQ] [hereinafter Oil
& Gas Recipients 2012]; Environment: Top Recipients 2010, OPENSECRETS, https://www
.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.php?ind=Q11&cycle=2010& recipdetail=S&mem=Y&
sortorder=U [https://perma.cc/G552-CJZN] [hereinafter Environment Recipients 2010];
Environment: Top Recipients 2012, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/indus
tries/recips.php?ind=Q11&recipdetail=S&sortorder=U&mem=Y&cycle=2012 [https://
perma.cc/AY5D-GHZ9] [hereinafter Environment Recipients 2012].
85 See id.; Oil & Gas: Top Recipients 2016, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/in
dustries/recips.php?ind=E01&recipdetail=S&sortorder=U&mem=Y&cycle=2016 [https://
perma.cc/5SJT-4Q4P] [hereinafter Oil & Gas Recipients 2016]; Environment: Top Recipients
2016, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.php?ind=Q11&recip
detail=S&sortorder=U&mem=Y&cycle=2016 [https://perma.cc/TRU2-BRX7] [hereinafter
Environment Recipients 2016].
86 Id.
87 See Oil & Gas Recipients 2012 and Environment Recipients 2012, supra note 84; Oil &
Gas: Top Recipients 2014, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips
.php?ind=E01&recipdetail=S&sortorder=U&mem=Y&cycle=2014 [https://perma.cc
/2QHW-JNGT] [hereinafter Oil & Gas Recipients 2014]; Environment: Top Recipients
2014, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.php?ind=Q11&recip
detail=S&sortorder=U&mem=Y&cycle=2014 [https://perma.cc/S967-XMTL] [hereinafter
Environment Recipients 2014].
88 See supra notes 84–87.
89 See Oil & Gas Recipients 2010, supra note 84.
90 See Environment Recipients 2010, supra note 84.
91 See Oil & Gas Recipients 2012, supra note 84.
92 See Environment Recipients 2012, supra note 84.
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Vitter did not rank within the top twenty recipients of contributions from
either Big Oil & Energy or environmental interest groups in 2014 or 2016.93
Senator Burr received contributions from both ends of the spec-
trum in the 2010 and the 2016 cycles.94 In 2010, Burr received $195,500
from the energy sector,95 and $13,250 from the environmental sector.96
In the 2016 cycle, Burr received $289,907 from Big Oil & Energy,97 and
$9,000 from environmental groups.98
Senator Bennet only received major contributions in 2010 and
2016.99 In 2010, Bennet received $126,120 from the energy sector,100 and
$166,221 from the environmental sector.101 In 2016, Bennet’s receipts from
the energy sector were roughly similar, at $138,940.102 However, the sena-
tor saw a dramatic increase in contributions from environmental groups
in 2016: $504,561.103
Senator Begich is an interesting case, as he lost his bid for re-
election in the 2014 cycle,104 yet he received substantial contributions from
both the energy and environmental groups in the 2012 and 2014 cycles. In
2012, energy groups contributed $78,950 to Begich,105 while environmental
organizations only contributed $11,500.106 In 2014, Begich saw a substan-
tial increase in contributions from both energy and environmental groups,
receiving $201,700 from energy107 and $103,771 from environmental
groups.108 The latter is nearly a tenfold increase from the previous cycle.
Finally, Senator Murkowski received substantial contributions
from the energy sector in each of the election cycles between 2010 and
93 See Oil & Gas Recipients 2014 and Environment Recipients 2014, supra note 87; Oil &
Gas Recipients 2016 and Environment Recipients 2016, supra note 85.
94 See Oil & Gas Recipients 2010 and Environmental Recipients 2010, supra note 84. See
also Oil & Gas Recipients 2016 and Environment Recipients 2016, supra note 85.
95 See Oil & Gas Recipients 2010, supra note 84.
96 See Environment Recipients 2010, supra note 84.
97 See Oil & Gas Recipients 2016, supra note 85.
98 See Environment Recipients 2016, supra note 85.
99 See Oil & Gas Recipients 2010 and Environment Recipients 2010, supra note 84.
100 See Oil & Gas Recipients 2010, supra note 84.
101 See Environment Recipients 2010, supra note 84.
102 See Oil & Gas Recipients 2016, supra note 85.
103 See Environment Recipients 2016, supra note 85.
104 Russell Berman, Another Senate Loss for Democrats, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 12, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/11/another-senate-loss-for-demo
crats/382660/ [https://perma.cc/3MA7-Y8YC].
105 See Oil & Gas Recipients 2012, supra note 84.
106 See Environment Recipients 2012, supra note 84.
107 See Oil & Gas Recipients 2014, supra note 87.
108 See Environment Recipients 2014, supra note 87.
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2016.109 In 2010, while still registered as Independent, Murkowski received
contributions from energy and environmental groups in the amounts of
$340,855110 and $8,450,111 respectively. However, after becoming a regis-
tered Republican, Murkowski failed to receive any contributions from
environmental groups.112 The senator consistently received contributions
from Big Oil & Energy in the amount of $84,450 (2012),113 $132,046
(2014),114 and $593,100 (2016).115
IV. THE SURGE IN SOFT MONEY EXPENDITURES
The contributions outlined in the above discussion are general
contributions from the energy and environmental sectors as a whole, and
as such, no specific donors are listed for each senator; these totals include
contributions from political action committees (“PACs”) and interest
groups.116 However, it is possible to examine changing trends in donor
habits, and this discussion will briefly turn to that examination before
the voting pattern analysis.
Recall from the campaign finance discussion, supra, that soft money
contributions are contributions that do not go directly to a candidate, but
to outside groups which indirectly support the candidate.117 Further recall
that, in general, soft money is virtually unregulated by the Federal Elec-
tion Commission.118
The election cycle ending in 2010 (the year Citizens United was
decided) saw significantly less soft money activity by both Big Oil & En-
ergy and environmental interest groups. Koch Industries, Chevron Corp.,
109 See Oil & Gas Recipients 2010 and Oil & Gas Recipients 2012, supra note 84; Oil &
Gas Recipients 2014, supra note 87; Oil & Gas Recipients 2016, supra note 85.
110 See Oil & Gas Recipients 2010, supra note 84.
111 See Environment Recipients 2010, supra note 84.
112 See Environment Recipients 2012, supra note 84; Environment Recipients 2014, supra
note 87; Environment Recipients 2016, supra note 85.
113 See Oil & Gas Recipients 2012, supra note 84.
114 See Oil & Gas Recipients 2014, supra note 87.
115 See Oil & Gas Recipients 2016, supra note 85.
116 Oil & Gas: Top Contributors 2010, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/indus
tries/contrib.php?ind=E01&Bkdn=DemRep&cycle=2010 [https://perma.cc/LRV2-2ENP]
[hereinafter Oil & Gas Contributors 2010] (“Methodology: The numbers on this page are
based on contributions from donors (individuals as well as corporations and unions that
give directly from their treasuries) to outside groups and from PACs (including super
PACs) and individuals giving more than $200 to candidates and party committees.”).
117 See discussion of soft money, supra Section II.B.
118 See discussion of McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122; supra Section II.B.
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and ExxonMobil have consistently fallen within the top energy industry
contributors; in 2010 each contributed $10,000 or less to outside spending
groups.119 By 2012, Chevron increased its contributions to outside groups
to $2,502,115, while ExxonMobil increased outside spending to $25,000.120
Koch Industries engaged in no outside group spending in 2012.121 By
2014, Koch Industries had re-entered the outside spending game, contrib-
uting a whopping $7,010,000 to outside groups, almost $5,000,000 more
than it spent on direct contributions to candidates.122 Chevron contributed
$1,002,675 to outside groups, almost half of its total political spending for
the cycle, while ExxonMobil reduced its outside spending to just $4,650.123
In 2016, Koch Industries contributed $6,050,000, more than half of its total
political spending in the cycle, to outside groups.124 Meanwhile, Chevron
increased its outside group spending to $3,340,685.125 ExxonMobil, for
the first time, failed to rank in the top five contributors.126
Shifting to environmental groups, the same trend is glaringly
apparent. Between 2010 and 2016, three groups remained within the ranks
of leading environmental group contributors: the League of Conservation
Voters, the Sierra Club, and Environment America.127 In 2010, the League
of Conservation Voters spent a total of $1,615,750 in political spending,
119 See Oil & Gas Contributors 2010, supra note 116 (Koch Industries: $10,000; Exxon:
$3,206; Chevron: $250).
120 Oil & Gas: Top Contributors 2012, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/indus
tries/contrib.php?ind=E01&Bkdn=DemRep&cycle=2012 [https://perma.cc/S3HZ-65YR]
[hereinafter Oil & Gas Contributors 2012].
121 Id.
122 Oil & Gas: Top Contributors 2014, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/indus
tries/contrib.php?ind=E01&Bkdn=DemRep&cycle=2014 [https://perma.cc/USG2-KZ3S]
[hereinafter Oil & Gas Contributors 2014].
123 Id.
124 Oil & Gas: Top Contributors 2016, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/indus
tries/contrib.php?ind=E01&Bkdn=DemRep&cycle=2016 [https://perma.cc/9ZAT-64DS]
[hereinafter Oil & Gas Contributors 2016].
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Environment: Top Contributors 2010, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/in
dustries/contrib.php?ind=Q11&Bkdn=DemRep&cycle=2010 [https://perma.cc/9JPZ-H9UC]
[hereinafter Environment Contributors 2010]; Environment: Top Contributors 2012, OPEN
SECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/contrib.php?ind=Q11&Bkdn=DemRep&
cycle=2012 [https://perma.cc/YCA9-2NEY] [hereinafter Environment Contributors 2012];
Environment: Top Contributors 2014, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/indus
tries/contrib.php?ind=Q11&Bkdn=DemRep&cycle=2014 [https://perma.cc/PSN7-FKQC]
[hereinafter Environment Contributors 2014]; Environment: Top Contributors 2016, OPEN
SECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/contrib.php?ind=Q11&Bkdn=DemRep&
cycle=2016 [https://perma.cc/F4RY-MVL8] [hereinafter Environment Contributors 2016].
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of which $560,353 went to outside groups.128 The Sierra Club spent
$454,178 in total, of which $53,855 went to outside groups.129 Environ-
ment America spent a total of $182,276 and contributed $177,611 of that
to outside spending groups.130 In 2012, each of these numbers increased
dramatically: the League of Conservation Voters sent $2,430,639 to outside
spending groups; the Sierra Club sent $703,002 to outside spending
groups; and Environment America sent $5,271,994 to outside spending
groups.131 Each of these contributions constitutes significantly more than
half of the groups’ total political spending for the cycle.132
In 2014, the League of Conservation Voters contributed just shy
of $2,000,000 to outside spending groups, slightly less than half of the
group’s total expenditures for the cycle.133 The Sierra Club increased its
outside spending to $990,500, well above half of its total expenditures.134
Environment America saw a considerable decrease in total cyclical expen-
ditures, but still contributed $1,225,000 to outside spending groups—just
$99,800 less than its total spending.135 This decrease was short-lived, how-
ever, as 2016 saw Environment America contribute $6,875,000 to outside
spending groups.136 The League of Conservation Voters invested only $1,000
to outside groups in this cycle, expending over $4,100,000 on candidates.137
Finally, the Sierra Club significantly curtailed its political spending, total-
ing only $436,707, of which only $400 went to outside groups.138
Despite the general fluctuations in the amount of contributions,
there can be little doubt, after having seen the above numbers, that both
energy and environmental groups capitalized on the state of campaign
finance post–Citizens United. Soft money contributions were significantly
less restricted than direct contributions to candidates, thus giving rise
to the significant spike in said contributions illustrated above.139 The
question remains, of course, what impact this sudden influx of money
into the campaign realm had upon legislators’ voting habits, and while
128 See Environment Contributors 2010, supra note 127.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 See Environment Contributors 2012, supra note 127.
132 Id.
133 See Environment Contributors 2014, supra note 127.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 See Environment Contributors 2016, supra note 127.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 See discussion of contributions, supra Section II.B.
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this Note seeks to address that topic in a limited fashion, a number of
academics have performed in-depth political science analyses of the con-
sequences of unfettered soft money contributions.140 That said, there can
be little doubt that, in general, exceptionally more wealth was pouring
into the political realm post-2010.
V. VOTING PATTERNS
This Note now shifts to the discussion of voting patterns. To focus
the examination, Senate roll call votes will be broken down by congres-
sional session and by “positive environmental” legislation and “negative
environmental” legislation. For the purposes of this analysis, positive en-
vironmental legislation includes amendments to bills that would promote
or expand the following: (1) environmental regulations; (2) recognition of
manmade climate change; or (3) climate change education. Negative en-
vironmental legislation includes efforts to reduce environmental regula-
tion and efforts to expand development of the fossil fuel sector (including
tax breaks for that industry).
In the 112th Congress (2011–2012), six votes relating to environ-
mental legislation were held, of which four were negative environmental
legislation;141 one was positive environmental legislation;142 and one was
neither positive nor negative.143 Table 1.1 breaks down the votes of the
selected senators on these pieces of legislation.
140 See Note, supra note 80; Pastine & Pastine, supra note 80; Apollonia & La Raja, supra
note 80; Milyo, supra note 57.
141 Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, 158 CONG. REC. S1504 (daily ed.
Mar. 8, 2012) [hereinafter 112th Roll Vote No. 34] (seeking to approve the Keystone XL
Pipeline project); SBIR/STTR Reauthorization Act of 2011, 157 CONG. REC. S2154 (daily
ed. Apr. 6, 2011) [hereinafter 112th Roll Vote No. 54] (prohibiting the EPA from promul-
gating regulation concerning the emission of greenhouse gas to address climate change);
SBIR/STTR Reauthorization Act of 2011, 157 CONG. REC. S2154 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 2011)
[hereinafter 112th Roll Vote No. 53] (suspending action under the Clean Air Act with
respect to carbon dioxide or methane emissions); SBIR/STTR Reauthorization Act of
2011, 157 CONG. REC. S2154 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 2011) [hereinafter 112th Roll Vote No. 51]
(prohibiting regulation of greenhouse gases from certain sources).
142 Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, 158 CONG. REC. S1504 (daily ed.
Mar. 8, 2012) [hereinafter 112th Roll Vote No. 32] (providing for the restoration of
natural resources, ecosystems, and wildlife habitats in the Gulf Coast States).
143 Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2012, 158 CONG. REC. S3155 (daily ed.
May 15, 2012) [hereinafter 112th Roll Vote No. 94] (restricting the financing of certain
fossil fuel projects in foreign countries, and prohibiting financing of renewable energy
products manufactured in foreign countries).
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TABLE 1.1144
Begich Bennet Burr Vitter Murkowski
112th Roll Vote No. 51 Yea Nay Nay Nay Nay
112th Roll Vote No. 53 Nay Nay Nay Nay Nay
112th Roll Vote No. 54 Nay Nay Yea Yea Yea
112th Roll Vote No. 34 Yea Yea Nay Yea Yea
112th Roll Vote No. 32 Nay Nay Yea Yea Yea
112th Roll Vote No. 94 Yea Nay Yea Yea Yea
In the 113th Congress (2013–2014), three votes on environmental
matters were conducted: one was the confirmation of Regina McCarthy
as Director of the Environmental Protection Agency;145 one was a piece
of negative environmental legislation centering on exemptions from emis-
sions standards;146 and one was a piece of negative environmental legisla-
tion focusing on prohibiting further greenhouse gas regulations.147 Table
1.2 illustrates the votes of the selected senators on these items.
TABLE 1.2148
Begich Bennet Burr Vitter Murkowski
113th Roll Vote No. 180 Yea Yea Nay Nay Nay
113th Roll Vote No. 72 Nay Nay Yea Yea Yea
113th Roll Vote No. 76 Nay Nay Yea Yea Yea
In the 114th Congress (2015–2016), eleven votes relating to
environmental matters were conducted. Of these, five derived from
144 See 112th Roll Votes, supra notes 141–43.
145 Cloture Motion, 159 CONG. REC. S5776 (daily ed. July 18, 2013) [hereinafter 113th Roll
Vote No. 180] (Confirmation of Regina McCarthy, of Massachusetts, to be Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency).
146 Concurrent Budget Resolution on the Budget, Fiscal Year 2014, 159 CONG. REC. S2235
(daily ed. Mar. 22, 2013) [hereinafter 113th Roll Vote No. 72].
147 Concurrent Budget Resolution on the Budget, Fiscal Year 2014, 159 CONG. REC. S2235
(daily ed. Mar. 22, 2013) [hereinafter 113th Roll Vote No. 76].
148 See 113th Roll Votes, supra notes 145–47.
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positive environmental legislation,149 five were derived from negative
environmental legislation (including the passage of the Keystone XL
Pipeline Act),150 and one was neither positive nor negative.151 Note that
Senator Begich was not present in this Congress, as he failed to secure
re-election.152 Table 1.3 illustrates the votes cast by the selected senators
on these matters.
TABLE 1.3153
Bennet Burr Vitter Murkowski
114th Roll Vote No. 31 Nay Nay Nay Nay
114th Roll Vote No. 12 Yea Nay Nay Nay
114th Roll Vote No. 115 Yea Nay Nay Yea
149 Energy Policy Modernization Act of 2015, 162 CONG. REC. S470 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2016)
[hereinafter 114th Roll Vote No. 11] (seeking to establish a federal energy efficiency
resource standard for electricity and natural gas suppliers); Every Child Achieves Act of
2015, 161 CONG. REC. S5092 (daily ed. July 15, 2015) [hereinafter 114th Roll Vote No.
238] (seeking to establish a climate change education program); Concurrent Resolution
on the Budget, Fiscal Year 2016, 161 CONG. REC. S1960 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2015)
[hereinafter 114th Roll Vote No. 115] (seeking to establish a reserve fund for responding
to economic and national security threats posed by human-induced climate change);
Keystone XL Pipeline Act, 161 CONG. REC. S555 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2015) [hereinafter
114th Roll Vote No. 31] (seeking public health risk assessment for potential rupture of
Keystone XL Pipeline); Keystone XL Pipeline Act, 161 CONG. REC. S311 (daily ed. Jan.
21, 2015) [hereinafter 114th Roll Vote No. 12] (seeking to express the sense of Congress
regarding climate change).
150 Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 162 CONG.
REC. S2424 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 2016) [hereinafter 114th Roll Vote No. 63] (seeking to
withhold certain funds for the construction of environmental infrastructure); Energy
Policy Modernization Act of 2015, 162 CONG. REC. S470 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2016) [here-
inafter 114th Roll Vote No. 12.2] (seeking to establish deadlines and expedite permits for
natural gas gathering lines on federal and Indian lands); Concurrent Resolution on the
Budget, Fiscal Year 2016, 161 CONG. REC. S1960 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2015) [hereinafter
114th Roll Vote No. 116] (seeking to prohibit withholding highway funds for states’
failure to comply with Clean Power Plan implementation requirements); Keystone XL
Pipeline Approval Act—Veto, 161 CONG. REC. S1274 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 2015) [hereinafter
114th Roll Vote No. 68] (overriding Presidential veto to approve Keystone XL Pipeline
Act); Keystone XL Pipeline Act, 161 CONG. REC. S620 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2015) [herein-
after 114th Roll Vote No. 49] (approving the Keystone XL Pipeline Act).
151 Keystone XL Pipeline Act, 161 CONG. REC. S372 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2015) [hereinafter
114th Roll Vote No. 20] (seeking to express the sense of the Senate regarding the
conditions for the President entering into bilateral or other international agreements
regarding greenhouse gas emissions).
152 See Berman, supra note 104.
153 See 114th Roll Votes, supra notes 149–51.
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Bennet Burr Vitter Murkowski
114th Roll Vote No. 238 Yea Nay Nay Nay
114th Roll Vote No. 11 Yea Nay Nay Nay
114th Roll Vote No. 116 Nay Yea Yea Yea
114th Roll Vote No. 63 Nay Nay Nay Nay
114th Roll Vote No. 12.2 Nay Yea Yea Yea
114th Roll Vote No. 49 Yea Yea Yea Yea
114th Roll Vote No. 68 Yea Yea Yea Yea
114th Roll Vote No. 20 Nay Yea Yea Yea
Finally, in the 115th Congress (2017–2018), two confirmation
hearings have taken place for the Administrator154 and Assistant Admin-
istrator155 of the Environmental Protection Agency. Table 1.4 illustrates
the results of the selected senators’ votes in these confirmation proceed-
ings. Note that only Senators Bennet, Burr, and Murkowski are still in
office during the 115th Congress.
TABLE 1.4156
Bennet Burr Murkowski
115th Roll Vote No. 71 Nay Yea Yea
115th Roll Vote No. 268 Nay Yea Yea
VI. ANALYSIS
The 2010 election cycle had the most direct impact upon the
voting decisions in the 112th Congress. As set out above, the impact of
Citizens United had not yet been felt in the campaign finance realm, as
154 On the Nomination (Confirmation of Scott Pruitt, of Oklahoma, to be Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency), 115th Cong. (Feb. 17, 2017) [hereinafter 115th
Roll Vote No. 71].
155 On the Nomination (Confirmation of William L. Wehrum, of Delaware, to be Assistant
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency), 115th Cong. (Nov. 9, 2017)
[hereinafter 115th Roll Vote No. 268].
156 See 115th Roll Votes, supra notes 154–55.
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direct candidate contributions were still the prevailing source of funding.157
Note, however, that the voting patterns also appear to be more sporadic,
with Democratic and Republican senators voting less frequently along
party lines.158
By the 113th Congress, both energy and environmental groups
dramatically increased their political spending directly to candidates and
to outside spending groups.159 Simultaneously, the data reflects a hard
shift to party-line votes among the analyzed senators, including Senator
Murkowski, who was officially a Republican in this cycle.160 In this and
the following Congresses, Senator Murkowski saw steady increases in
donations from Big Oil & Energy, and consistently voted in favor of
negative environmental legislation.161
In the 114th Congress, a new problem arose in negative environ-
mental legislation: the Keystone XL Pipeline Act. Keystone XL was viewed
by some Americans as a potential source of a vast number of jobs for
working class persons.162 Despite still-significant hard and soft money
expenditures by the environmental community,163 the voting data show
a deviation from the hard party-line votes of the 113th Congress, specifi-
cally in legislation relating to the Keystone XL Pipeline164 and the cre-
ation of environmental infrastructure165 (which could have been viewed
as hindering the passage of the Keystone XL Pipeline Act). Assuming,
arguendo, that job creation is a more politically powerful tool than
environmental regulation, this could explain the voting pattern devia-
tions displayed above.
Finally, in the 115th Congress, the only data currently extant
refers to the confirmations of Scott Pruitt and William Wehrum to the
Administrator and Assistant Administrator posts at the EPA.166 Again,
157 See Oil & Gas Contributors 2010, supra note 116; Environment Recipients 2010, supra
note 84.
158 See 112th Roll Votes, supra notes 141–43.
159 See discussion of contributions, supra Section III.B.
160 See 113th Roll Votes, supra notes 145–47.
161 See 113th Roll Votes, supra notes 145–47; 114th Roll Votes, supra notes 149–51; 115th
Roll Votes, supra notes 154–55.
162 Glenn Kessler, Will Keystone XL pipeline create 42,000 ‘new’ jobs?, WASHINGTON POST
(Jan. 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/01/06/will-key
stone-xl-pipeline-create-42000-new-jobs/?utm_term=.ccccb116fba1 [https://perma.cc/CZ
9U-THKG].
163 See Environment Contributors 2014, supra note 127.
164 See 114th Roll Vote No. 49 and 114th Roll Vote No. 68, supra note 150.
165 See 114th Roll Vote No. 63, supra note 150.
166 See 115th Roll Votes, supra notes 154–55.
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in the 2016 contribution cycle, environmental and energy groups in-
creased their expenditures167 (potentially as a result of the presidential
election), but we again see a hard shift to party-line voting.168 Of course,
much like the Keystone XL Pipeline in the 114th Congress, there is
potentially a driving force behind this party-line shift: these votes con-
cerned confirmation proceedings. There is further support for this theory,
as these confirmations were only successful as a result of a very narrow
Republican majority in the Senate, and the lowering of the threshold
number of approving senators to a simple majority.169
VII. DISCUSSION AND NEED FOR REFORM
To sum up the above discussion, based upon the very brief cross-
section analyzed above, there is evidence of a general shift to party-line
voting on environmental matters post–Citizens United, except in the case
of the Keystone XL Pipeline Act (a deviation which is potentially ex-
plained by the prevailing political importance of job creation). This discus-
sion is not meant to suggest that the correlation between sharp increases
in soft money expenditures and senators’ voting patterns is evidence of
causation; rather, this discussion is merely designed to illustrate one
potential explanation for the shift to party-line voting: the sheer increase
in soft money political spending by both the energy and environmental
sectors after 2010 and Citizens United v. FEC.
At this point, the reader may be wondering how this relates to the
decline of the use of the Treaty Clause for environmental treaties. Sev-
eral factors tie these topics together: (1) treaties require the consent of at
least two-thirds of the United States Senate to become legally binding;
(2) environmental legislation is becoming increasingly partisan, potentially
as a result of significant increases in both energy and environmental spend-
ing; and (3) the increase in party-line votes is making the two-thirds
majority hurdle much harder to pass.
Without modifying the current structure of the campaign finance
system, unlimited, unregulated, and unreported contributions to politicians,
167 See Oil & Gas Contributors 2016, supra note 85; Environment Contributors 2016, supra
note 127.
168 See 115th Roll Votes, supra notes 154–55.
169 Carol Davenport, Senate Confirms Scott Pruitt as E.P.A. Head, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/us/politics/scott-pruitt-environmental-protec
tion-agency.html [https://perma.cc/V9ZJ-XHE7].
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their campaigns, and their political committees will continue to increase.
Since at least the late 1990s, scholars and politicians have identified a
major need for soft money regulation.170 Despite an attempt to legislate
in this area via BCRA in 2002, the United States Supreme Court and
lower federal courts have consistently pulled back on Congress’s efforts
to regulate the influx of unconnected (meaning not connected to a partic-
ular candidate) money into federal elections.171 In reducing the effective-
ness of Congress’s attempted regulations (or invalidating them altogether)
the courts have perhaps inadvertently fostered a campaign finance system
in which the political voices of the less financially powerful are drowned
out by major industries. In this Note, I have not sought to compare the
voice of the solitary person to that of ExxonMobil; rather, I have sought
to compare the effectiveness of the voices of large voluntary political
organizations, like the League of Conservation Voters, to those of major
industrial speakers.
One can hardly deny that oil and energy companies are some of
the most profitable companies in the United States, as they provide two
of the most essential resources for everyday American life: gasoline for
transportation and energy to power American homes and businesses.
This is reflected in the amounts these companies currently spend on
political activity. However, current spending does not reflect the poten-
tial influence major corporations could have if they chose to channel
more of their profits into segregated funds or into outside groups which
do not directly benefit candidates. For example, Exxon Mobil reported a
profit of $7.8 billion in 2016 alone.172 Chevron, while reporting a surprising
loss in 2016 of nearly $500 million, saw a profit of $4.5 billion in 2015.173
Koch Industries is not included because it is a privately held company and
does not release financial statements; the SEC, however, reports that
Koch Industries has an annual revenue of approximately $60 billion.174
170 See Milyo, supra note 57; see also Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, tit. I, Pub.
L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, 81–88 (2002).
171 See EMILY’s List v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 581 F.3d 1 (2009); Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
172 ExxonMobil Earns $7.8 Billion in 2016; $1.7 Billion During Fourth Quarter, EXXONMOBIL
(Jan. 31, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://news.exxonmobil.com/press-release/exxonmobil-earns-78
-billion-2016-17-billion-during-fourth-quarter [https://perma.cc/C288-WFFF].
173 CHEVRON, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, https://www.chevron.com/-/media/chevron/annual-re
port/2016/2016-Annual-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VJB-ZW4Z].
174 SEC, FACTS ABOUT KOCH INDUSTRIES, INC., https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data
/41077/000119312505225958/dex993.htm [https://perma.cc/CJ3L-E23C].
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Contrast these numbers with the total annual revenues of four
major environmental organizations in the United States175: the Conserva-
tion Fund reported a total revenue of $171 million; the Natural Resources
Defense Council reported $110 million; the Nature Conservancy reported
$926 million; and the Sierra Club reported just $56 million.176 Combined,
these environmental groups cannot eclipse the spending power of the
least powerful of the three energy companies mentioned above.
As is established in the preceding section, it is clear that none of
the corporate entities listed, nor any of the environmental organizations
discussed, are funneling the entirety of its annual revenue into political
spending. One should, however, use this comparison as a tool to under-
stand the disparity in influence that energy and oil companies could have
in the political realm if they chose to do so. At present, however, the
contributions discussion above177 show the current state of affairs, and
while the contribution levels of energy giants and environmental groups
are disparate, they are not as dramatically disparate as they have the
potential to be. If the above voting shifts are, in fact, attributable to the
disparities in contributions at the current levels, one need only imagine
the problems that would ensue from dramatic contribution disparity; this
is why it is politically and democratically important to stymie this possi-
bility before it gets out of hand.
In campaign finance cases, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
rejected the notion that monetary distortion of influence in the political
sphere is a compelling government interest sufficient to justify imposing
limits on protected political speech of corporations.178 Solely for the sake
of argument, return to the now-overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber
of Commerce decision: there, the Court unequivocally upheld a Michigan
state law which regulated independent corporate expenditures on the
ground that the law sought specifically to eliminate the distortion caused
175 Note that Environment America and the League of Conservation Voters do not publish
financial records indicating the total donations received by their organizations. If they
did, those groups would be listed here with the Sierra Club instead of the other organiza-
tions listed.
176 The 200 Largest U.S. Charities—Environmental/Animal, FORBES, https://www.forbes
.com/lists/2011/14/200-largest-us-charities-11_rank-environment-animal.html [https://
perma.cc/WC6J-ZC9F].
177 See discussion of contributions, supra Section III.B.
178 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310. But see Austin, 494 U.S. at 652 overruled by
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310 (discussing distortion rationale).
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by corporate spending.179 The majority noted that the law at issue en-
sured that corporate expenditures (from the segregated fund) reflected
“actual public support for the political ideas espoused by corporations.”180
This argument gives rise to yet another potential justification for insti-
tuting regulations on corporate expenditures in political campaigns: the
distinction between corporate and human speakers.
Fundamentally, there is a difference between a corporation and
a voluntary interest group like the environmental groups listed above.
Voluntary political associations are comprised of human speakers with
a shared common interest seeking to further that interest through political
speech, and that goal tends to be their only activity (there is usually no
sole-profit business interest).181 In terms of the groups mentioned above,
all are dependent upon private donors to fund their activist efforts.182
Corporate entities, on the other hand, do not fit the same mold.
It is generally safe to assume that many Americans work for corporations
with whom they do not share common political interests. Further, unlike
voluntary political associations, corporations do not engage in solely
political activity: by definition, corporations engage in business activity,
usually for the purpose of gaining profit.183 In essence, this analysis harkens
back to the framework set forth in MCFL.184 Recall that the framework
there was designed to create exceptions to corporate expenditure limits
for corporations that did not act as businesses, but as voluntary political
associations.185 The pertinent criteria were: (1) the corporation was formed
for the express purpose of promoting political ideas and cannot engage in
business activity; (2) the corporation has no shareholders or other claim-
ants to its assets or earnings; and (3) the corporation does not accept
contributions from business corporations and labor unions.186
179 Austin, 494 U.S. at 661.
180 Id.
181 See generally Political Organizations, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM (2018), https://www.encyclo
pedia.com/social-sciences/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/political-organi
zations [https://perma.cc/3WCP-FZRC].
182 See FORBES, supra note 176 (the Conservation Fund reported $57 million from private
donors, the Natural Resources Defense Council reported $95 million from private donors,
the Nature Conservancy reported $527 million from private donors, and the Sierra Club
reported $49 million from private donors).
183 Corporation, INVESTOPEDIA (2018), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/corporation
.asp [https://perma.cc/Z3J9-YY3V].
184 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 478 U.S. 238 (1986).
185 Id. at 263–64.
186 Id. at 264.
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The Court’s reasoning in MCFL resonates today, as it leaned
heavily on precedent pointing to the need to restrict the influence of cor-
porate wealth in political expenditures. The Court was focused primarily
upon the government’s interest in preventing corruption, or the appear-
ance of corruption, in political expenditures,187 but the same reasoning
easily transfers to the anti-distortion principle. For example, consider the
following rationales considered by the Court in support of curtailing
corporate spending: “restricting ‘influence of political war chests funneled
through the corporate form,’”188 the need to “eliminate the effect of aggre-
gated wealth on federal elections,”189 the need to “curb the political influ-
ence of ‘those who exercise control over large aggregations of capital,’”190
and the regulation of “substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the
special advantages which go with the corporate form of organization.”191
Each and every rationale cited by the MCFL Court could feasibly
justify corporate expenditure regulations on the basis that the mass
aggregation of wealth possessed by corporations allows said corporations
to funnel wealth into post–Citizens United unlimited soft money spending.
One need only look to the 2010 and 2012 election cycles, discussed above,192
to see the significant jump in soft money expenditures. Permitting cor-
porations to do so has effectively allowed them to inject significantly
more monetary influence into the political stream than any other private
voice, whether it be an individual or a voluntary political organization.193
This is a particular concern in the realm of environmental activism, as
there is such a massive disparity in wealth between the opposing sides
of the political fight.194 Privately funded voluntary political organizations
and special interest groups stand to lose some level of influence when
competing with the contributions and expenditures of the fossil fuel and
energy industries.
187 Id. at 256–57.
188 Id. at 257 (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 499
(1985)).
189 Id. (citing Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 413–15 (1972)).
190 MCFL, 479 U.S. at 257 (citing United States v. Int’l Union United Auto., Aircraft and
Agr. Implement Workers of America, 352 U.S. 567, 584 (1957)).
191 Id. (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 206 (1982)).
192 See discussion of contributions, supra Section III.B.
193 See, e.g., Oil & Gas Contributors 2014, supra note 122; Environment Contributors 2014,
supra note 127 (Koch Industries contributed $7.1 million to outside groups, nearly double
the combined contributions of the top three environmental groups).
194 See discussion of profit margins, supra Part VII; see also discussion of contributions,
supra Section III.B.
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Encouraging campaign finance reform that comports with the
framework established in MCFL would place corporations under more
scrutiny while still permitting them to engage in the political speech pro-
tected under the First Amendment. The purpose is not to chill or prohibit
corporate political speech, but to ensure that it is not so powerful as to
drown out the voices of noncorporate entities in order to prevent dramati-
cally disproportionate corporate influence over legislators.195 By prevent-
ing further increases in disparity between Big Oil & Energy corporations
and environmental voluntary political associations, it is possible to ensure
that both groups have an opportunity to persuade Senators to support
their respective interests. While this course of action may not increase
the potential success of future potential environmental treaties, it will
at least ensure such treaties will be afforded a healthy, vigorous debate
rather than a mere party-line vote.
CONCLUSION
This Note has, against the backdrop of environmental treaties and
the Treaty Clause of the United States Constitution, sought to illustrate
the effect Citizens United v. FEC has had upon senators’ voting habits
regarding environmental matters. In the years since Citizens United, cor-
porate entities of all kinds (including those in Big Oil & Energy) have
channeled large portions of their political activity into contributions to out-
side spending groups, also known as soft money expenditures. Nonprofit
entities, including environmental interest organizations and voluntary
political associations, have also increased their contributions to outside
spending groups, but some organizations are beginning to pull back on
this course of action.196 The continued non-regulation of soft money
contributions in campaign finance has the potential to create a massive
disparity in the influence corporate entities (like Big Oil & Energy) and
American voters, by way of voluntary political associations, have over
federal legislators. This disparity in influence will almost certainly impact
the decisions of United States senators in deciding whether to enter into
binding international environmental treaties.
195 See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 394–95, 420–21 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing
the Court’s long history of distinguishing between corporate and human speech, as well
as current comparable distinctions between student speech, foreign speech, and speech
by prisoners).
196 See Environment Contributors 2016, supra note 127.
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Again, however, the purpose of this Note is not to state that the
contributions discussed above were the direct cause of the voting habits
of the senators.197 Rather, the purpose is to illustrate one potential expla-
nation for the increasing number of party-line votes cast in the Senate,
and note that such an increase will burden the ability of the President
and the Senate to surpass the two-thirds Senate majority required to
bind the United States to multinational environmental treaties. I have
chosen to focus upon environmental treaties specifically because the
United States has simply not entered into any in recent memory,198 but
the nation has regularly considered and adopted other types of treaties
in the last ten years.199 Rather, the United States has shifted to a prac-
tice of executive-congressional agreements (much like the Paris Climate
Accord) meant to bypass the requirements of the Treaty Clause in agree-
ing to international climate frameworks.200
Noting this shift in agreement mechanisms brings this Note to its
final remarks. Of course, the preceding discussion cannot exist without
an acknowledgment of a number of potential counterpoints. The most
obvious counter-argument is that a plethora of factors impact the voting
preferences of elected legislators, including everything from the general
political climate, the geographic region represented, the State represented,
the types of campaign contributors, and the amount of contributions re-
ceived from those donors. In response, I again note that the preceding is
merely an exploration of one potential explanation for the post–Citizens
United voting shifts. Another counter is that energy giants and environ-
mental groups traditionally contribute to the opposite parties (energy to
197 See discussion of voting patterns, supra Part V.
198 The last comprehensive environmental treaty the Senate seems to have considered
was the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, in which the United
States failed to sign onto the Convention via the Kyoto Protocol. See United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
199 See, e.g., Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal,
Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing, Can.-U.S., Nov. 22, 2009, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 112
-4 (2011) (fishing); Treaty with Russia on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation
of Strategic Offensive Arms, Russ.-U.S., Apr. 8, 2010, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 111-6 (arms
regulation).
200 This is perhaps best explained by constitutional law professor, Noah Feldman, who
states that executive agreements, unlike treaties, do not become the supreme law of the
United States. In essence, the executive agreements simply do not bind the United States to
the framework’s terms, but do acknowledge the United States’ intention to adhere to said
terms. See Noah Feldman, The Paris Accord and the Reality of Presidential Power, BLOOM-
BERG (June 2, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-06-02/trump
-paris-climate-change-and-constitutional-realities [https://perma.cc/43RM-6CFY].
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Republicans, environment to Democrats). I have attempted to reduce this
concern by analyzing a cross-section of senators who receive contribu-
tions from both groups.
A final counterpoint is that the United States simply does not need
to enter environmental treaties when we have the executive agreement
process. In response, it suffices to say that this Note derived from the un-
certainty the United States faced regarding the Paris Climate Agreement,
including whether the States were bound by its terms, and how the nation
could rescind its agreement to the Accord. Had the United States entered
the Paris Climate Accord under the Treaty Clause, these concerns would
never have arisen, as the answers are clearly found in our jurisprudence.201
Even if the United States’ shift to a practice of congressional-
executive agreements ensures that the nation continues to engage in
global environmental efforts without the need for multinational treaties,
many environmental efforts must be handled domestically, and that will
require the cohesion and cooperation of both leading political parties.
While campaign finance is surely only one of the myriad causes of party-
line voting, reforming the campaign finance system and regulating soft
money will go far in quelling the expansive influence corporate donors
have in the electoral system. That, in itself, will go a long way toward
closing the rift between the controlling parties and fostering a political
system in which all legislation, environmental or otherwise, is not con-
trolled by the industry or group with the largest wallet, but by the ideals
of the American voters.
201 See Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 683 (1887) (confirming that valid treaties under
the Treaty Clause are binding on the States); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979)
(affirming that the President may unilaterally withdraw from a treaty).

